Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
4
pubmed:dateCreated
2006-3-30
pubmed:abstractText
Two different modes of theorising about delusions are explored. On the one hand is the motivational approach, which regards delusions as serving a defensive, palliative, even potentially adaptive function. On the other, is the cognitive deficit approach, which conceptualises delusions as explicitly pathological, involving abnormalities in ordinary cognitive processes. The former approach, prominently exemplified by the psychoanalytic tradition, was predominant historically, but has been challenged in recent years by the latter. Some grievances against psychoanalytic theory are briefly discussed, and it is argued that although the reasons for psychoanalysis falling into scientific disrepute are partly justified, the psychodynamic notion that motivation has access to the mechanisms of belief formation is of potentially crucial theoretical utility. A variety of possible syntheses of the two theoretical modes are therefore explored, in the belief that the most comprehensive account of delusions will involve a theoretical unification of both styles of explanation. Along the way, an attempt is made to locate the notions delusion, defence, and self-deception in a shared theoretical space.
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:status
PubMed-not-MEDLINE
pubmed:month
Aug
pubmed:issn
1354-6805
pubmed:author
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:volume
10
pubmed:owner
NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
305-26
pubmed:dateRevised
2009-1-16
pubmed:year
2005
pubmed:articleTitle
"Sleights of mind": delusions, defences, and self-deception.
pubmed:affiliation
Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science (MACCS), Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia. ryan@maccs.mq.edu.au
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article