Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
1
pubmed:dateCreated
2000-11-20
pubmed:abstractText
The false belief task has often been used as a test of theory of mind. We present two reasons to abandon this practice. First, passing the false belief task requires abilities other than theory of mind. Second, theory of mind need not entail the ability to reason about false beliefs. We conclude with an alternative conception of the role of the false belief task.
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
IM
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:month
Oct
pubmed:issn
0010-0277
pubmed:author
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:day
16
pubmed:volume
77
pubmed:owner
NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
B25-31
pubmed:dateRevised
2004-11-17
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed:year
2000
pubmed:articleTitle
Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind.
pubmed:affiliation
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8205, USA. paul.bloom@yale.edu
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article