Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
6726
pubmed:dateCreated
1999-4-29
pubmed:abstractText
The evolution of competitive interactions among viruses was studied in the RNA phage phi6 at high and low multiplicities of infection (that is, at high and low ratios of infecting phage to host cells). At high multiplicities, many phage infect and reproduce in the same host cell, whereas at low multiplicities the viruses reproduce mainly as clones. An unexpected result of this study was that phage grown at high rates of co-infection increased in fitness initially, but then evolved lowered fitness. Here we show that the fitness of the high-multiplicity phage relative to their ancestors generates a pay-off matrix conforming to the prisoner's dilemma strategy of game theory. In this strategy, defection (selfishness) evolves, despite the greater fitness pay-off that would result if all players were to cooperate. Viral cooperation and defection can be defined as, respectively, the manufacturing and sequestering of diffusible (shared) intracellular products. Because the low-multiplicity phage did not evolve lowered fitness, we attribute the evolution of selfishness to the lack of clonal structure and the mixing of unrelated genotypes at high multiplicity.
pubmed:commentsCorrections
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
IM
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:month
Apr
pubmed:issn
0028-0836
pubmed:author
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:day
1
pubmed:volume
398
pubmed:owner
NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
441-3
pubmed:dateRevised
2010-11-18
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed:year
1999
pubmed:articleTitle
Prisoner's dilemma in an RNA virus.
pubmed:affiliation
Department of Biology, University of Maryland, College Park 20742, USA. paul.e.turner@uv.es
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article, Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S., Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't