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| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| lifeskim:mentions | |
| pubmed:issue |
4489
|
| pubmed:dateCreated |
1981-4-24
|
| pubmed:abstractText |
Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
|
| pubmed:commentsCorrections | |
| pubmed:language |
eng
|
| pubmed:journal | |
| pubmed:citationSubset |
IM
|
| pubmed:status |
MEDLINE
|
| pubmed:month |
Mar
|
| pubmed:issn |
0036-8075
|
| pubmed:author | |
| pubmed:issnType |
Print
|
| pubmed:day |
27
|
| pubmed:volume |
211
|
| pubmed:owner |
NLM
|
| pubmed:authorsComplete |
Y
|
| pubmed:pagination |
1390-6
|
| pubmed:dateRevised |
2011-2-11
|
| pubmed:meshHeading |
pubmed-meshheading:7466396-Animals,
pubmed-meshheading:7466396-Biological Evolution,
pubmed-meshheading:7466396-Cooperative Behavior,
pubmed-meshheading:7466396-Game Theory,
pubmed-meshheading:7466396-Humans,
pubmed-meshheading:7466396-Mathematics,
pubmed-meshheading:7466396-Models, Biological,
pubmed-meshheading:7466396-Selection, Genetic
|
| pubmed:year |
1981
|
| pubmed:articleTitle |
The evolution of cooperation.
|
| pubmed:publicationType |
Journal Article
|