Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
3
pubmed:dateCreated
1984-12-26
pubmed:abstractText
This article argues that the ordinary/extraordinary distinction has little or no moral value when preservation of life is not given a near absolute status. What is appealed to instead is a determination of both medical and moral duties, upon which appropriate treatment decisions should be based. Included is a partial delineation of those duties.
pubmed:commentsCorrections
pubmed:keyword
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
E
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:month
Sep
pubmed:issn
0306-6800
pubmed:author
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:volume
10
pubmed:owner
NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
128-30
pubmed:dateRevised
2009-11-18
pubmed:otherAbstract
KIE: The author maintains that the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary medical treatment has little or no moral value unless one accepts an almost absolute obligation to preserve life. Rejecting such an obligation, he proceeds to consider the obligations upon which appropriate treatment decisions should be based. These duties are identified as the provision of competent medical care to improve quality of life with due attention to the patient's desires, consideration of the family's wishes and the economic and psychological impact on society, and avoidance of litigation.
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed:year
1984
pubmed:articleTitle
Intended goals and appropriate treatment: an alternative to the ordinary/extraordinary distinction.
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article