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Predicate | Object |
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rdf:type | |
lifeskim:mentions | |
pubmed:issue |
1
|
pubmed:dateCreated |
1990-1-24
|
pubmed:abstractText |
A game-theoretical analysis of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma shows that the evolution of ensembles of stochastic strategies displays a dynamics of high complexity and unpredictability.
|
pubmed:language |
eng
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pubmed:journal | |
pubmed:citationSubset |
IM
|
pubmed:status |
MEDLINE
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pubmed:month |
Mar
|
pubmed:issn |
0022-5193
|
pubmed:author | |
pubmed:issnType |
Print
|
pubmed:day |
7
|
pubmed:volume |
137
|
pubmed:owner |
NLM
|
pubmed:authorsComplete |
Y
|
pubmed:pagination |
21-6
|
pubmed:dateRevised |
2006-11-15
|
pubmed:meshHeading | |
pubmed:year |
1989
|
pubmed:articleTitle |
Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity.
|
pubmed:affiliation |
Institut für Theoretische Chemie, Universität Wien, Austria.
|
pubmed:publicationType |
Journal Article,
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
|