Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
pubmed:issue
7266
pubmed:dateCreated
2009-10-15
pubmed:abstractText
Cooperative social systems are susceptible to cheating by individuals that reap the benefits of cooperation without incurring the costs. There are various theoretical mechanisms for the repression of cheating and many have been tested experimentally. One possibility that has not been tested rigorously is the evolution of mutations that confer resistance to cheating. Here we show that the presence of a cheater in a population of randomly mutated social amoebae can select for cheater-resistance. Furthermore, we show that this cheater-resistance can be a noble strategy because the resister strain does not necessarily exploit other strains. Thus, the evolution of resisters may be instrumental in preserving cooperative behaviour in the face of cheating.
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
IM
pubmed:chemical
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:month
Oct
pubmed:issn
1476-4687
pubmed:author
pubmed:issnType
Electronic
pubmed:day
15
pubmed:volume
461
pubmed:owner
NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
980-2
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed:year
2009
pubmed:articleTitle
Cheater-resistance is not futile.
pubmed:affiliation
Department of Molecular and Human Genetics, Baylor College of Medicine, One Baylor Plaza, Houston, Texas 77030, USA.
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article, Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S., Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't