Linked Life Data

17393402

Source:http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/id/17393402

Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
2
pubmed:dateCreated
2007-4-4
pubmed:abstractText
A teleological and behavioral view is presented of the concept of free will. Free will is not something people essentially have or do not have. Instead, the following question is asked: Why does society find it useful to label some actions free and some actions not free? It is argued that the function of such labels is to aid in assigning responsibility to people for their actions. Responsibility in turn is useful in assigning rewards and punishments. The sort of actions that are typically seen as free are the same as those seen as self-controlled. Such actions are responsive to environmental contingencies of relatively wide temporal extent.
pubmed:grant
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
IM
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:issn
0735-3936
pubmed:author
pubmed:copyrightInfo
Copyright (c) 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:volume
25
pubmed:owner
NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
235-50
pubmed:dateRevised
2007-12-3
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed:year
2007
pubmed:articleTitle
Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism.
pubmed:affiliation
Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794, USA. howard.rachlin@sunysb.edu
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article, Research Support, N.I.H., Extramural