15447533

Source:http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/id/15447533

Download in:

Switch to

Custom View

Named Graph Language Inference

Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
Predicate	Object
rdf:type	pubmed:Citation
lifeskim:mentions	umls-concept:C0026192, umls-concept:C0150593, umls-concept:C0205246
pubmed:issue	2 Pt 2
pubmed:dateCreated	2004-9-27
pubmed:abstractText	We introduce a simple extension of the minority game in which the market rewards contrarian (respectively, trend-following) strategies when it is far from (respectively, close to) efficiency. The model displays a smooth crossover from a regime where contrarians dominate to one where trend-followers dominate. In the intermediate phase, the stationary state is characterized by non-Gaussian features as well as by the formation of sustained trends and bubbles.
pubmed:language	eng
pubmed:journal	http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/journal/101136452
pubmed:status	PubMed-not-MEDLINE
pubmed:month	Aug
pubmed:issn	1539-3755
pubmed:author	pubmed-author:De MartinoAA, pubmed-author:GiardinaII, pubmed-author:MarsiliMM, pubmed-author:TedeschiAA
pubmed:issnType	Print
pubmed:volume	70
pubmed:owner	NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete	Y
pubmed:pagination	025104
pubmed:year	2004
pubmed:articleTitle	Generalized minority games with adaptive trend-followers and contrarians.
pubmed:affiliation	INFM-SMC and Dipartimento di Fisica, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Piazzale A. Moro 2, 00185 Roma, Italy.
pubmed:publicationType	Journal Article