Linked Life Data

14992232

Source:http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/id/14992232

Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
4
pubmed:dateCreated
2004-3-1
pubmed:abstractText
We examine competition in the hospital industry, in particular the effect of ownership type (for-profit, not-for-profit, government). We estimate a structural model of demand and pricing in the hospital industry in California, then use the estimates to simulate the effect of a merger. California hospitals in 1995 face an average price elasticity of demand of -4.85. Not-for-profit hospitals face less elastic demand and act as if they have lower marginal costs. Their prices are lower than those of for-profits, but markups are higher. We simulate the effects of the 1997 merger of two hospital chains. In San Luis Obispo County, where the merger creates a near monopoly, prices rise by up to 53%, and the predicted price increase would not be substantially smaller were the chains not-for-profit.
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
T
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:issn
0741-6261
pubmed:author
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:volume
34
pubmed:owner
HSR
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
764-85
pubmed:dateRevised
2004-11-17
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed:year
2003
pubmed:articleTitle
Competition among hospitals.
pubmed:affiliation
Carnegie Mellon University and National Bureau of Economic Research, USA. mgaynor@cmu.edu.
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article