Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
5
pubmed:dateCreated
2002-7-11
pubmed:abstractText
A change in payment mechanism for inpatient care from per diem to per episode creates two incentives - a marginal and an average price effect - to change length of stay. The decrease in marginal price per day to zero should reduce the length of stay, while an increase in average price per inpatient stay should increase the length of stay. This study uses data from a natural experiment to estimate both marginal and average price elasticities, and to test whether the length of stay falls after the introduction of prospective payment in a sample of 8509 severely mentally ill patients. We estimate that the marginal price elasticity is zero, but the average price elasticity is between 0.16 and 0.20. The results were generally robust for short- and long stayers, and for persons admitted early and late after the change in payment mechanism. The model controlled for hospital fixed effects and individual random effects.
pubmed:grant
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
IM
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:month
Jul
pubmed:issn
1057-9230
pubmed:author
pubmed:copyrightInfo
Copyright 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:volume
11
pubmed:owner
NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
377-87
pubmed:dateRevised
2007-11-14
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Adolescent, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Adult, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Female, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Health Services Research, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Hospitals, Psychiatric, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Hospitals, Voluntary, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Humans, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Insurance, Hospitalization, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Length of Stay, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Male, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Massachusetts, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Medicaid, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Mental Disorders, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Middle Aged, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Models, Econometric, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Prospective Payment System, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Psychiatric Department, Hospital, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Quality Assurance, Health Care, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-Reimbursement, Incentive, pubmed-meshheading:12112488-United States
pubmed:year
2002
pubmed:articleTitle
Does prospective payment reduce inpatient length of stay?
pubmed:affiliation
Department of Health Policy and Administration, School of Public Health, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 27599-7411, USA. edward.norton@unc.edu
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article, Research Support, U.S. Gov't, P.H.S.