Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
6
pubmed:dateCreated
2001-12-18
pubmed:abstractText
We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50% of those with overt symptoms. Vaccination would stop the outbreak within 365 days after release only if disease transmission were reduced to <0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25% were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by > or = 33%. In such a scenario, approximately 4,200 cases would occur and 365 days would be needed to stop the outbreak. Historical data indicate that a median of 2,155 smallpox vaccine doses per case were given to stop outbreaks, implying that a stockpile of 40 million doses should be adequate.
pubmed:commentsCorrections
http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/commentcorrection/11747722-10037590, http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/commentcorrection/11747722-10367824, http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/commentcorrection/11747722-10458961, http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/commentcorrection/11747722-10458962, http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/commentcorrection/11747722-10458963, http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/commentcorrection/11747722-3734432, http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/commentcorrection/11747722-4186804, http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/commentcorrection/11747722-460412, http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/commentcorrection/11747722-460424, http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/commentcorrection/11747722-5007552, http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/commentcorrection/11747722-8261250, http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/commentcorrection/11747722-9204289
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
IM
pubmed:chemical
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:issn
1080-6040
pubmed:author
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:volume
7
pubmed:owner
NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
959-69
pubmed:dateRevised
2009-11-18
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed:articleTitle
Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon.
pubmed:affiliation
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atalnta, Georgia 30333, USA.qzm4@cdc.gov
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article