Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
1
pubmed:dateCreated
2001-3-29
pubmed:abstractText
Ross argues that the location problem for color-the problem of how it is represented as occupying a particular location in space-constitutes an objection to color subjectivism. There are two ways in which the location problem can be interpreted. First, it can be read as a why-question about the relation of visual experience to the environment represented: Why does visual experience represent a patch of color as located in this part of space rather than that? On this interpretation, the subjectivist can answer Ross's objection by appealing to the physical location of reflectance rather than color. Second, it can be read as a how-question about visual representation itself: How does visual experience put together the experience of a color with the experience of its being located in space? This version makes the location problem a problem about visual experience itself and renders the ontology of color irrelevant to its solution. The location problem is thus no more a problem for the color subjectivist than for the color realist.
pubmed:commentsCorrections
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
IM
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:month
Mar
pubmed:issn
1053-8100
pubmed:author
pubmed:copyrightInfo
Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:volume
10
pubmed:owner
NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
59-62; discussion, 146-56
pubmed:dateRevised
2008-11-21
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed:year
2001
pubmed:articleTitle
Spatial location in color vision.
pubmed:affiliation
Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3168, Australia. Ian.Gold@arts.monash.edu.au
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article, Comment