Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
2
pubmed:dateCreated
2000-7-20
pubmed:abstractText
In this paper, a sex-dependent matrix game haploid model is investigated. For this model, since the phenotypes of female and male individuals are determined by alleles located at a single locus and are sex dependent, any given genotype corresponds to a strategy pair. Thus, a strategy pair is an ESS if and only if the allele corresponding to this strategy pair cannot be invaded by any mutant allele. We show that an ESS equilibrium must be locally asymptotically stable if it exists.
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
IM
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:month
May
pubmed:issn
0022-5193
pubmed:author
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:day
21
pubmed:volume
204
pubmed:owner
NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
191-200
pubmed:dateRevised
2010-11-18
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed:year
2000
pubmed:articleTitle
Evolutionarily stable strategy in a sex- and frequency-dependent selection model.
pubmed:affiliation
Département de Mathématiques et de Statistique, Université de Montréal, Québec, Canada.
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article, Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't