Linked Life Data

10129837

Source:http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/id/10129837

Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
3
pubmed:dateCreated
1993-12-21
pubmed:abstractText
This paper studies the efficiency effects of physician fees when the insurer (possibly the government) pays a fee for each procedure, and the doctor may supplement the fee by an extra charge to the patient, a practice known as 'balance billing.' Monopolistically competitive physicians can discriminate among patients on the basis of both price and quality. Equilibria with and without balance billing are compared. The paper analyzes and recommends a new fee policy, a form of payer 'fee discrimination.'
pubmed:grant
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
H
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:month
Oct
pubmed:issn
0167-6296
pubmed:author
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:volume
12
pubmed:owner
NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
239-58
pubmed:dateRevised
2007-11-14
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed:year
1993
pubmed:articleTitle
Should physicians be permitted to 'balance bill' patients?
pubmed:affiliation
Department of Economics, Boston University, MA 02215.
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article, Research Support, U.S. Gov't, P.H.S., Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't