| pubmed-article:9473316 | pubmed:abstractText | Building on earlier work by Pascual-Leone (1970) and Case (1985), Olson (1989; 1993) set out a theory showing how a series of incremental changes in capacity for "holding in mind" could account, in part, for children's acquisition of a theory of mind. Following Piaget (1951) infants were said to employ schemata for maintaining relations with objects and events in the presence of those events. At about 18 months children became capable of holding in mind an object so as to free the perceptual system to perceive a second object and form a relation between the two, allowing for what Piaget called the "symbolic function" and what Olson described as predication. At around 4 years, the period examined in the present study, children were said to acquire the ability to represent that predicative relation as a belief or as true or false. That was the stage at which children were said to possess a theory of mind. The present study tested the hypothesized relation between development of a theory of mind and increasing computational resources. Three-, four-, and five-year-old children's performance on a pair of theory of mind tasks was compared with that on a pair of dual processing tasks designed on the basis of Baddeley's (1986) model of working memory. The resulting correlations, as high as r = .64 between the tasks, suggest that changes in capacity to hold in mind allow the expression of, and arguably the formation of, a theory of mind. | lld:pubmed |
