| pubmed-article:11494246 | pubmed:abstractText | Plaud (J Clin Psychol 57, 1089-1102, 1109-1111, 1119-1120) and Ilardi and Feldman (J Clin Psychol 57, 1067-1088, 1103-1107, 1113-1117, 1121-1124) argue for two very different approaches to clinical science and practice (i.e., behavior analysis and cognitive neuroscience, respectively). We comment on the assets and liabilities of both perspectives as presented and attempt to achieve some semblance of balance between the three protagonists embroiled in this current debate. The vision of clinical science we articulate is more ecumenical and evolutionary, rather than paradigmatic and revolutionary. As we see it, the problem clinical psychology faces is much larger than the authors let on; namely, how best to make clinical science meaningful and relevant to practitioners, consumers, the general public, and the behavioral health-care community. Clinical psychology's immediate internal problem is not pluralism with regard to subject matter, worldview, methodology, or school of thought, but pluralism in clinical psychologists' adherence to a scientific epistemology as the only legitimate form of clinical psychology. On this latter point, we still have a very long way to go. | lld:pubmed |
