Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
2
pubmed:dateCreated
2007-9-12
pubmed:abstractText
In this article, I reply to criticisms of Dean Stretton of the pro-life argument from substantial identity. When the criterion for the right to life proposed by most proponents of the pro-life position is rightly understood--being a person, a distinct substance of a rational nature--this position does not lead to the difficulties Stretton claims it does.
pubmed:commentsCorrections
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
E
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:month
Feb
pubmed:issn
0269-9702
pubmed:author
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:volume
21
pubmed:owner
NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
93-7
pubmed:dateRevised
2009-11-19
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed:year
2007
pubmed:articleTitle
Substantial identity and the right to life: a rejoinder to Dean Stretton.
pubmed:affiliation
Franciscan University of Steubenville, Steubenville, Ohio 43952, USA. plee@franciscan.edu
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article, Comment