Source:http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/id/17845493
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Predicate | Object |
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rdf:type | |
lifeskim:mentions | |
pubmed:issue |
2
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pubmed:dateCreated |
2007-9-12
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pubmed:abstractText |
In this article, I reply to criticisms of Dean Stretton of the pro-life argument from substantial identity. When the criterion for the right to life proposed by most proponents of the pro-life position is rightly understood--being a person, a distinct substance of a rational nature--this position does not lead to the difficulties Stretton claims it does.
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pubmed:commentsCorrections | |
pubmed:language |
eng
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pubmed:journal | |
pubmed:citationSubset |
E
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pubmed:status |
MEDLINE
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pubmed:month |
Feb
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pubmed:issn |
0269-9702
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pubmed:author | |
pubmed:issnType |
Print
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pubmed:volume |
21
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pubmed:owner |
NLM
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pubmed:authorsComplete |
Y
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pubmed:pagination |
93-7
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pubmed:dateRevised |
2009-11-19
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pubmed:meshHeading | |
pubmed:year |
2007
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pubmed:articleTitle |
Substantial identity and the right to life: a rejoinder to Dean Stretton.
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pubmed:affiliation |
Franciscan University of Steubenville, Steubenville, Ohio 43952, USA. plee@franciscan.edu
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pubmed:publicationType |
Journal Article,
Comment
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