Linked Life Data

16463455

Source:http://linkedlifedata.com/resource/pubmed/id/16463455

Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
3
pubmed:dateCreated
2006-2-7
pubmed:abstractText
We examine optimal individual and entity-level liability for negligence when expected accident costs depend on both the agent's level of expertise and the principal's level of authority. We consider these issues in the context of physician and managed care organization (MCO) liability for medical malpractice. Under current law, physicians generally are considered independent contractors and hence MCOs are not liable for negligent acts by physicians. We find that the practice of reviewing the medical decisions of physicians affects their incentives to take care, which in turn implies that it is efficient for MCOs to be held liable for the torts committed by their physicians.
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
H
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:issn
0741-6261
pubmed:author
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:volume
36
pubmed:owner
HSR
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
494-519
pubmed:dateRevised
2006-11-15
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed:year
2005
pubmed:articleTitle
Torts, expertise, and authority: liability of physicians and managed care organizations.
pubmed:affiliation
New York University, USA. jennifer.arlen@nyu.edu
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article, Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't