Statements in which the resource exists as a subject.
PredicateObject
rdf:type
lifeskim:mentions
pubmed:issue
1478
pubmed:dateCreated
2001-8-27
pubmed:abstractText
It is often the case that individuals in a social group can perform certain tasks (such as hunting, for example) more efficiently if they collaborate with other individuals than if they act alone. In such situations one is necessarily faced with the problem of how the resource obtained as the result of such a collaboration should be divided among the collaborating individuals. If one of the individuals in the collaboration is in a position (through its dominance rank, for example) to impose a particular division of the resource on the other members of the collaboration then we show that an evolutionary dilemma arises which prevents such collaborations being evolutionarily stable. This dilemma, which is closely related to the well-known Ultimatum Game, results from the fact that in such situations natural selection favours individuals who, if dominant, offer smaller and smaller shares of the resource to the others and, if subdominant, will accept lower and lower offers. We also show, however, that this dilemma is naturally resolved in a spatially structured population with selection favouring the evolution of a fair division of the resource and consequently ensuring the evolutionary stability of collaborations of this type.
pubmed:language
eng
pubmed:journal
pubmed:citationSubset
IM
pubmed:status
MEDLINE
pubmed:month
Sep
pubmed:issn
0962-8452
pubmed:author
pubmed:issnType
Print
pubmed:day
7
pubmed:volume
268
pubmed:owner
NLM
pubmed:authorsComplete
Y
pubmed:pagination
1797-801
pubmed:dateRevised
2010-11-18
pubmed:meshHeading
pubmed:year
2001
pubmed:articleTitle
Spatial Ultimatum Games, collaborations and the evolution of fairness.
pubmed:affiliation
Zoology Institute, University of Basel, Rheinsprung 9, CH-4051 Basel, Switzerland. Timothy.Killingback@unibas.ch
pubmed:publicationType
Journal Article